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THE LAWYER'S DUTY OF CANDOR AND FAIRNESS
A DUTY TO CONFESS?*
RESPECT for the administration of justice depends in large measure on the
maintenance of the highest standards of professional conduct by the members
of the bar.I When these standards are not enforced, the public must bear the
burden of inadequate or irresponsible representation, vexatious litigation, and
the perversion of justice by delay, corruption, and negligence. The lawyer,
therefore, in his capacity as advocate, counselor, and officer of the court, must
be prepared to submit to continuing supervision and periodic investigation by
the bench. At the same time, lawyers, like other citizens, are guaranteed
certain rights and privileges by state and federal constitutions. The exercise
of these rights may interfere with the court's efforts to supervise the conduct
of its bar.
This issue recently confronted the New York Court of Appeals in Matter
of Cohen,2 where an attorney's exercise of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was alleged to violate his professional duty to cooperate in a judicial
inquiry into "ambulance chasing."3 When called before the inquiry, Cohen
was told that the hearing was merely investigative and was not a disciplinary
proceeding against him personally; he was to be questioned on matters within
the scope of the inquiry relating to his professional conduct. Cohen was also
informed that counsel for the inquiry had "information" indicating his par-
ticipation in professional misconduct, although the only evidence introduced
at this or later proceedings consisted of three hundred and four "statements
of retainer," which Cohen had filed under prevailing court rules. 4 On the
*Matter of Cohen, 7 N.Y.2d 488, 199 N.Y.S.2d 658, 166 N.E.2d 672 (1960), cert.
granted sub norn. Cohen v. Hurley, 363 U.S. 810 (1960).
1. See Preamble, Canons of Professional Ethics [hereinafter cited individually as
Canons] in N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw, appendix 765 (1948), and in BRAND, BAR ASSOCIATIONS,
ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES 797 (1956).
2. 7 N.Y.2d 488, 199 N.Y.S.2d 658, 166 N.E2d 672 (1960), cert. granted sub nor.
Cohen v. Hurley, 363 U.S. 810 (1960).
3. Prompted by charges of illegal, corrupt, and unethical practices, and of conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice, allegedly rife within the legal profession in the
County of Kings, the inquiry purposed "to expose all the evil practices with a view to
enabling this court to adopt appropriate measures to eliminate them and to discipline those
attorneys found to have engaged in them." Matter of Cohen, 9 App. Div. 2d 436, 437,
195 N.Y.S.2d 990, 993 (1959).
"Preliminary investigations" into charges of professional misconduct are authorized
by N.Y. JUrDICIARY LAw § 90(6). See note 39 infra.
For an historical review of the court's power to investigate professional misconduct
and compel testimony "subject to claim of privilege," see People ex rel. Karlin v. Culldn,
248 N.Y. 465, 474-77, 162 N.E. 487, 490-92 (1928) (Cardozo, J.).
4. For text of the rule requiring submission of statements of retainer, see Special
Rules Regulating the Conduct of Attorneys and Counselors at Law in the Second Judicial
Department, in CrwEVENGER'S PRACTICE MANUAL rule 3, p. 19-21 (1959).
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advice of counsel, Cohen claimed his privilege against self-incrimination under
the New York Constitution 5 and refused to produce subpoenaed documents
or to answer certain questions, despite warnings by the court that his refusal
might lead to disciplinary proceedings. The questions related to the identity
of his law office partners, associates, and employees, to his possession of the
records of the cases described in his statements of retainer, to the destruction
of such records, to his bank accounts, to payments to police officers, insurance
company employees, or others for referring claimants to him, to promises
to pay to any lay person ten per cent of recoveries or settlements, and to
whether one of his partners or associates had pleaded guilty to soliciting legal
business or employing "solicitors," a violation of the Penal Law.6 The presiding
justice thereafter recommended to the Appellate Division that disciplinary
proceedings be instituted against Cohen. In the hearings that followed, Cohen
admitted exercising his privilege against self-incrimination in response to con-
cededly relevant questions. The good faith of his refusal to answer was at no
time questioned. On the basis of these facts Cohen was disbarred, with leave
to re-enter the bar should he present himself before the judicial inquiry within
thirty days and answer such questions as might properly be put to him.7
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a divided opinion. The majority conceded
that Cohen had a right, as a citizen, to assert the privilege and to withhold
any answers which might incriminate him. But, said the court (quoting Judge
Cardozo's opinion in Matter of Rouss), "Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions.... Whenever the condition is broken the privilege
is lost." Among these conditions, the court declared, were the Canons ad-
monishing lawyers to inform the court of professional misconduct on the part
5. Article 1, § 6, N.Y. CONST. provides:
No person shall be . . .compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, providing, that any public officer who, upon being called before a grand
jury to testify concerning the conduct of his office or the performance of his
official duties, refuses to sign a waiver of immunity against subsequent criminal
prosecution, or to answer any relevant question concerning such matters before
such grand jury, shall by virtue of such refusal, be disqualified from holding any
other public office or public employment for a period of five years, and shall be
removed from office by the appropriate authority or shall forfeit this office at the
suit of the attorney general . . . . No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.
6. Canons 28 and 29 forbid payment to persons for soliciting legal business and require
lawyers to report such practices to the court; Canon 34 outlaws fee-splitting with non-
lawyers. Soliciting and fee-splitting are also criminal offenses. N.Y. PEN. LAw §§ 270-a,
270-d, 276 (1944).
7. Order of Disbarment by Appellate Division, 2d Dep't, Dec. 31, 1959, in Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, p. 66-67, Cohen v. Hurley, 363 U.S. 810 (1960). The disbarment
order was stayed pending appeal to Court of Appeals. Cohen v. Hurley, 10 App. Div. 2d
581, 196 N.Y.S2d 277 (1960).
8. Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84-85, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917) quoted, in inverse
order, in Matter of Cohen, 7 N.Y.2d at 495, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 662, 166 N.E.2d at 675.
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of others 9 and to be candid and fair with the court at all times.' 0 Therefore,
Cohen was not disciplined for invoking his constitutional privilege, but because
he had breached his "inviolable and absolute duty to co-operate with the
court in a valid and proper investigation of unethical practices."" Similar re-
strictions upon public employees were cited, 12 apparently as authority for
placing this restraint upon the legal profession.
The court's construction of the state self-incrimination clause would be
subject to federal review only if arbitrary or discriminatory. 13 Even if it can-
not be attacked on these grounds, however, the importance of the privilege
claimed and the severity of the sanction imposed for its exercise warrant
further inquiry into the propriety of the court's decision. The New York
decision "preserves" the lawyer's right against self-incrimination by leaving
him an almost impossible choice: if he remains silent, he may be dis-
barred; if he speaks, he may be subject to criminal prosecution. The threat
of being forced to abandon an established legal practice has such coercive force
that, practically, the attorney must confess or explain all his actions to the
inquiring tribunal.
This result has been rejected by the two other states which have considered
this problem directly, as well as by earlier New York decisions.' 4 In Sheiner
v. State,15 the Florida court reversed an order of disbarment based on the
9. Canon 29.
10. Canon 22.
11. 7 N.Y.2d at 492, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 660, 166 N.E.2d at 674. (Emphasis added.)
12. Id. at 496, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 663, 166 N.E.2d at 676. The court cited Beilan v.
Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958) (school teacher dismissed for "incompetency") ;
Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) (subway conductor dismissed for "doubtful trust
and reliability") ; Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960) (county employee
dismissed for "insubordination").
13. The privilege against self-incrimination is not a requisite of due process. Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
The privilege having been created by state law, it remains for the state to define the
scope of its protection. Under the prevailing view in both federal and state jurisdictions,
these limitations were not overstepped in Cohen by holding that the privilege itself
provided protection only from criminal prosecution and not from noncriminal sanctions
such as professional discipline. McCoRMIcK, EvIDENCE § 128 (1954) ; 8 WIaIAORE, EVI-
DENCE § 2254 (3d ed. 1940), § 2255 (Supp. 1959) (both citing cases).
14. But see Matter of Fenn, 235 Mo. App. 24, 128 S.W.2d 657 (1939).
15. 82 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1955).
Sheiner may be distinguishable, however, because, in part of the opinion, the court
seems to consider the issue to be the validity of drawing inferences from the claim of
privilege:
If any court can hold that appellant's refusal to answer the query, whether he is
now or ever was a member of the Communist Party, supported by nothing more
than the evidence taken by the Congressional Committee . . .and inferences there-
from, is sufficient to disbar him, then one's privilege to practice law may be made
to depend on a very tenuous thread . . . .I do not think the state can abandon
proof of charges against an attorney for unprofessional conduct and disbar him on




exercise of the privilege both before a congressional subcommittee and during
subsequent disbarment proceedings. In In re Holland,'6 the Illinois court
reversed the suspension of a lawyer who had allegedly exercised the privilege
in bad faith before a grand jury, after concluding that the privilege had in
fact been claimed in good faith. In both these cases it was held that the exer-
cise of the privilege, without more, would not support disciplinary action.
Two earlier New York cases, Matter of Grae 17 and Matter of Ellis '8 held that
a lawyer could not be disbarred for refusing to waive his statutory immunity
before being questioned.' 9 Both cases involved judicial inquiries into profes-
sional misconduct. This policy also seemed to govern in two other New York
cases, where attorneys who exercised the privilege before a grand jury 20 and
during a criminal trial 21 were held immune from disciplinary action. While
the Cohen court distinguished Grae and Ellis, it admitted that the distinction
was "slight" and was being used as an opportunity to "re-examine" the ques-
tion in issue.22
In performing this re-examination, however, the New York court failed
to articulate and to weigh the policies involved in this unprecedented disciplin-
ary procedure. The court's reliance upon government employee cases, induced
perhaps by literal adherence to the "court officer" notion, does not suffice.
Other courts, in resolving similar problems, have recognized that lawyers can-
not be classified with government employees: lawyers are neither paid by the
government, nor are they expected to adhere in employee-like fashion to the
policy directives of superiors.23 Even less guidance is furnished by the court's
16. 377 Ill. 346, 36 N.E.2d 543 (1941).
17. 282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963 (1940).
18. 282 N.Y. 435, 26 N.E.2d 967 (1940).
19. Both cases have been widely cited for the proposition that the exercise of a
constitutional right cannot be a breach of duty to the court. See In re Holland, 377
Ill. 346, 353-54, 36 N.E.2d 543, 547 (1941) ; Sheiner v. State, 82 So. 2d 657, 661-62 (Fla.
1955) ; In re the Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, 103 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1956) ;
Koenigsberg v. State Bar California, 353 U.S. 252, 270 (1957); Note, 8 ALA. L. Rav.
358, 360 (1956) ; Note, 16 LA. L. Rav. 577, 580 (1956).
20. In re Solovei, 250 App. Div. 117, 293 N.Y. Supp. 640 (1937), aff'd, 276 N.Y. 647,
12 N.E.2d 802 (1938). Since the precise question was, as in Grae and Ellis, refusal to
waive immunity, the court in Cohen might have distinguished Solovei on that ground.
See note 22 infra. The court, however, chose to distinguish it because a different forum
was involved. See note 31 infra.
21. In re Kaffenburgh, 188 N.Y. 49, 80 N.E. 570 (1907) (dictum-disbarment affirmed
on other grounds).
22. The precise question in Grae and Ellis . . .was as to whether a lawyer who
offered to answer all pertinent questions could be compelled in such an investigation
to waive immunity in advance of questioning.
7 N.Y.2d at 497, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 664, 166 N.E.2d at 677.
23. Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956) (attorneys distinguished from
other officers of the court such as marshals, bailiffs, clerks, and judges in that attorneys
are "engaged in a private profession, important though it be to our system of justice") ;
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378 (1866) ("The profession of an attorney
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conclusionary statement that membership in the bar is a "privilege burdened
with conditions," since the reasons for the particular "condition" imposed in
Cohen are not explored.
Conditions or duties imposed upon the lawyer should be reasonably related
to maintaining those qualities of the bar which are essential to the proper per-
formance of its role in the administration of justice.2 4 But even those forms
of conduct which are properly labeled "conditions" may in particular instances
be waived in order to preserve a more important countervalue. Certainly the
lawyer's duty to "co-operate with the court" or to be "candid and fair" cannot
be said to be "absolute and inviolate" in the sense that it requires his com-
pliance with every demand of a particular judicial incumbent.25 As but one
example, the lawyer's duty of "entire devotion to the interests of the client"
within the boundaries of the law,26 combined with the lawyer-client privilege,2 7
could justify his withholding information which would be helpful to the ad-
ministration of justice. Although this example does not dispose of the problem
in Cohen, it does indicate that the extent of a lawyer's duty to "cooperate"
can only be determined by evaluating the effects of silence and disclosure upon
the countervailing ends served by each.
The lawyer's duty to be candid and fair with the court owes its existence
to the role he plays in judicial proceedings: the court must place great con-
fidence in the competence and integrity of his presentation of cases, his argu-
ment, and his reference to authority. To cite a case or statute known to be
inapplicable, to fail to call to the court's attention a case or statute known
to be controlling, or wilfully to falsify or suppress evidence is to mislead the
court.28 Such conduct frustrates the dispensation of justice in the particular
case and in turn, by destroying public faith in the bar and the courts, threatens
and counsellor is not like an office created by an act of Congress, which depends for its
continuance, its powers, and its emoluments upon the will of its creator . . . ") ; In re
Holland, 377 Ill. 346, 358, 36 N.E.2d 543, 549 (1941) (lawyer's duty to investigate crime
distinguished from that of policeman) ; cf. Sowers v. Wells, 150 Kan. 630, 633, 95 P.2d
281, 283-85 (1939) (attorneys distinguished from "public officers"); in re Galusha, 184
Cal. 697, 698, 195 Pac. 406 (1921) ("attorneys are not public officers, but are engaged
in a private profession pursued primarily for pecuniary profit").
24. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957).
25. "It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance
of its supreme importance. . . ." Canon 1.
26. Canon 15.
27. The privilege actually belongs to the client. Thus, if the client waives the privi-
lege, it cannot be claimed for the benefit of anyone else, including the attorney. McCoR-
micK, EvIDENCE § 96 (1954) ; 8 WIGmoRE, EViDENCE § 2321 (3d ed. 1940). On the other
hand, the attorney not only may refuse to divulge the protected confidences of the
client; under the rule and its supporting statutes he must so refuse unless the client
waives the privilege or the court rules against it. Ibid.
28. Canon 22; see Vickers v. State Bar, 32 Cal. 2d 247, 196 P.2d 10 (1948) ; In re
Williams, 221 Minn. 554, 23 N.W.2d 4 (1946). See generally JEssuP, THE PRoFEssiONAL
IDEALS OF THE LAWYER 17 (1925).
[Vol. 70:288
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to undermine the administration of justice generally. When the lawyer appears
as a witness in court or before a judicial inquiry, however, his duty of candor
and fairness should be read in the light of the role he is then playing. When
the lawyer testifies as to observed fact, the court need place no special reliance
on him because of his training or experience. As a witness, only his abilities
to observe, recall, and narrate the facts are important, and disclosure cannot
be said to be more important merely because the witness has a legal degree.
Of course, the lawyer may be disciplined for false testimony, but here discipline
is invoked because deceit reveals moral turpitude,29 not because it involves any
abuse of the lawyer's peculiar relationship to the court. Similarly, when a
lawyer claims his privilege not to answer, he does not mislead the court or
violate a special judicial confidence; rather, his refusal calls attention to the
fact that the court's data of decision is incomplete. Moreover, the privilege
being incontestably available to all citizens, including lawyers, its exercise can-
not be equated with moral turpitude.
The New York Court of Appeals seems to have recognized this limitation
in some circumstances, for it has not applied the duty of candor to lawyer-
witnesses testifying at trial or before the grand jury.30 By distinguishing those
cases from Cohen, however, on the basis of the difference in the proceeding
involved,31 the court has implied that the general inquiry into professional mis-
conduct differs from other judicial proceedings and that extension of the duty
to be candid is somehow justified in this case. The distinction between trials
and general inquiries cannot rest upon a greater likelihood of deceit, for the
lawyer is the same kind of witness in both proceedings. Nor can the privilege
against self-incrimination be any less applicable in the general inquiry; as the
court itself admitted,3 2 the privilege is available in any proceeding in which
the information sought could be used in a criminal prosecution.33 The most
likely justification for the distinction is a practical one: the general inquiry can-
not function effectively without full disclosure by its witnesses. Although both
29. See N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90(2); Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 283 (1882):
No question can be made of the power of a court to strike a member of the bar
from the roll for official misconduct.... We do not mean to say that there may
not be cases of misconduct not strictly professional, which would clearly show a
person not fit to be an attorney, nor fit to associate with honest men. Thus, if
he was proved to be a thief, a forger, a perjurer, or guilty of other offenses of
the crinmten falsi.
30. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
31. "Kaffenburgh's refusal to testify was at a criminal trial ... and Solovei's was
before a grand jury." 7 N.Y.2d at 497, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 664, 166 N.E.2d at 677.
32. 7 N.Y.2d at 495, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 662, 166 N.E.2d at 675.
33. In the Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 86, 116 N.E. 782, 784 (1917) (disbarment
proceedings) ; see Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949) (administrative hearing) ;
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (civil proceedings); Phleps v. Phleps, 133
N.J. Eq. 392, 32 A.2d 81 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943) (deposition); State v. Kemp, 126
Conn. 60, 9 A.2d 63 (1939) (grand jury) ; In the Matter of Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244, 177
N.E. 489 (1931) (legislative committee hearing).
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the grand jury and the general inquiry often investigate problems of wide-
spread misconduct, counsel for the general inquiry may receive less investi-
gative assistance from the state's law enforcement agencies ;34 therefore, he
may not have the resources necessary to investigate each suspected offender.
The imposition of a duty to confess is one way to compensate for this lack of
information.
On the other hand, the preservation of the safeguards of individual liberty,
and the control of inquisitorial methods are ends which would be served by
upholding the right of silence. Our society has so highly regarded the self-
incrimination privilege as to elevate it to constitutional status in all but two
states.35 The practical necessity for this privilege is particularly apparent in
broad general inquiries such as the one in Cohen. An "inviolable" duty to dis-
close facts on demand can be utilized to purge the bar of members suspected
of substantive misconduct without ever offering proof of their offense. If many
attorneys are subjected to questioning, perhaps on the basis of nothing more
than rumor, suspicion, or hunch, a certain number may be forced to invoke
the self-incrimination privilege when, notwithstanding their innocence, their
answers would contribute to a circumstantial case against them. If they may then
be disbarred for "lack of candor," the disciplinary authority need never justify
its inquiry or confront the attorneys with any evidence of the suspected sub-
stantive misconduct, thus depriving the attorneys of an opportunity to rebut
or explain. Moreover, the possibility under the Cohen rule of disbarring with-
out proof of misconduct affords an opportunity to persecute attorneys for
conduct or beliefs not officially proscribed but nevertheless unpopular. While
such abuses need not occur if officials act with restraint and integrity, a system
of justice which must rely upon the self-restraint of officials is foreign to the
entire heritage of procedural due process. 36
34. Two factors may dictate this result: first, to those directing the police and other
official investigative agencies, the problem of "ambulance chasing" or other unprofessional
conduct, even if it is also criminal, may not compare in urgency with the problem of
combating other types of crime, either because of the official's subjective evaluation of
the problem or because greater public pressure is centered on the other forms of crime;
and second, it must be recognized that the day-to-day concern of police and other investi-
gators of established agencies is with activities other than lawyer misconduct, thus
minimizing the routine accumulation of evidence. These factors are, of course, interrelated.
On the other hand, it should be noted that these official investigative resources are
not of equal value to all criminal investigations. For example, in investigating such
white-collar crimes as embezzlement, tax fraud, or conspiracy to violate anti-trust laws,
a grand jury might benefit somewhat from a preliminary screening of potential witnesses,
but its principal reliance must, like that of judicial inquires into unethical conduct, be
placed on the power to compel testimony and the production of documents.
35. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 92 (1908). The two exceptions are
New Jersey and Iowa, and both those states have codified the privilege. N.J. REv. STAT.
§ 81-5 (Supp. 1952) ; IOWA CODE AxN. § 622.14 (1950).
36. Under any system which permits John Doe to be forced to answer on the mere
suspicion of an officer of the law, or on public rumor, or on secret betrayal, two
[Vol. 70: 288
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The duty to confess would doubtless expedite the disciplinary process.
Whether it would promote the proper administration of justice more than its
ultimate abuse would degrade the process is doubtful. In light of this doubt,
therefore, the court ought first to consider whether the existing procedures for
investigation are in fact so inadequate that they force this difficult choice. If
the interests of society, court, and lawyer can all be accommodated by a pro-
cedure less subject to abuse, the Cohen rule should be rejected.
These interests might be accommodated, without resort to the artificial
charge of "lack of candor," by the use of other commonly accepted and less
severe sanctions for refusal to answer. Disbarment for substantive misconduct
is often made possible by a refusal to answer. Several jurisdictions have held
that an attorney's silence in the face of substantial evidence of misconduct
permits the indulgence of,3 7 or even "irresistably impels,"3' the most unfavor-
able inferences from the credible evidence before the court. When a court con-
ducting a general inquiry is faced with an "uncooperative" witness, it could
make use of this sanction by introducing evidence of the lawyer's misconduct
and then interrogating him again about that conduct. If the independent evi-
dence were sufficient to permit an inference of misconduct, that inference
could be established conclusively by the witness's continued refusal to answer
relevant questions. This procedure, in effect, temporarily turns the general in-
quiry into a preliminary disciplinary proceeding 39 against the reluctant witness.
In the disbarment proceedings which follow, the attorney's attack upon the pre-
sumption of misconduct could be limited to demonstrating that the independent
evidence presented below could not logically support the inference of miscon-
duct. In this manner, the witness would be disciplined only for substantive
abuses have always prevailed and inevitably will prevail; first, the petty judicial
officer becomes a local tyrant and misuses his discretion for political or mercenary
or malicious ends; secondly, a blackmail is practiced by those unscrupulous mem-
bers of the community ....
8 WrIGoRE, EvmENCE § 2251 (3d ed. 1940).
A similar observation was made with regard to due process requirements in criminal
procedure by Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, natur-
ally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal in tracking
down crime is not in itself an assurance of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness
in law enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experi-
ence has therefore counseled that safeguards must be provided against the dangers
of the overzealous as well as the despotic.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943).
37. In the Matter of Fenn, 235 Mo. App. 24, 128 S.W.2d 657 (1939) (failure to take
the stand) ; cf. 8 WIGUxoR, EviDENcE § 2272(5) (3d ed. 1940) (civil action).
38. In re Wellcome, 23 Mont. 450, 468, 59 Pac. 445, 452 (1899), cited with approval
by In re Vaughan, 189 Cal. 491, 496, 209 Pac. 353, 355 (1922), and in turn by Fish v.
State Bar, 214 Cal. 215, 222, 4 P.2d 937, 940 (1931).
39. Actually, according to one reading of the enabling statute, only hearings and
investigations relating to charges are authorized. N.Y. JuDicIARY LAw § 90(6).
1960]
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misconduct, and not for claiming the privilege against self-incrimination. Ad-
mittedly, this sanction could not be applied when the information sought was
not related to the lawyer's own misconduct; a refusal to answer questions
about one set of facts cannot affect the inference drawn from another unrelated
set of facts. Nor would this sanction be helpful if the court of inquiry has no
independent evidence of misconduct. But in either of these cases, the court
would be alerted to the possibility of misconduct and could thereafter investi-
gate the lawyers who claimed the privilege. In this way, the inquiry would
act as a screen to narrow down the number of suspects and would thus ease
the investigative burden. Moreover, to the extent that discipline for a refusal
to answer is actually grounded on an unspoken belief that the witness was
guilty of the alleged misconduct,40 the suggested procedure recognizes the
reason for discipline and requires proof of it.
Other factors which discourage a claim of privilege should also be con-
sidered. The lawyer must always be circumspect in refusing to answer because
a claim of privilege unsupported by reasonable fear of criminal prosecution
would itself be grounds for disbarment. Moreover, the lawyer must also
consider the likelihood that a refusal to answer will trigger a thorough investi-
gation of his professional affairs, which in turn may result in the loss of
personal and professional reputation, professional discipline, and even criminal
sanctions. Even if the accused lawyer is guilty of misconduct, he may be
induced to answer by the tendency of courts to regard full disclosure as evi-
dence of atonement which warrants less severe discipline. For example, a
New York court considered a two-year suspension adequate discipline in the
case of a lawyer accused of ambulance chasing who "had done nothing to
impede the court's investigation . . .but, on the contrary, has been open and
frank in his statements," even though, "as a general rule ... the lawyer who
engages in 'ambulance chasing' disqualifies himself from the practice of law."'42
40. If the attorney could prove that the disbarment had in fact been based upon
such a belief, or inference, the disbarment would violate due process. See Konigsberg v.
State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (admission to the bar) ; Slochower v. Board
of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551, rehearing denied, 351 U.S. 944 (1956) (dismissal from
teaching position). The difficulty, however, is that the proof fails if the words used by
the court disclaim any resort to the drawing of inferences. See Nelson v. County of Los
Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960) ; Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Lerner
v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
In Cohen, the Court of Appeals was careful to avoid drawing any inferences from the
claim of privilege. See 7 N.Y.2d at 497, 199 N.Y.S2d at 664, 166 N.E.2d at 677.
41. In the Matter of Levy, 255 N.Y. 223, 225, 174 N.E. 461, 462 (1931). Care must
be taken, however, to be judicious in applying the label of bad faith to a claim of privilege,
as will be apparent from a reading of In the Matter of Ellis, 258 App. Div. 558, 17
N.Y.S.2d 800 (1940).
42. In the Matter of Katzka, 225 App. Div. 250, 251-52, 232 N.Y. Supp. 575, 576-77
(1929) ; see In re Cohn, 10 Ill. 2d 186, 191, 139 N.E.2d 301, 303 (1956) (censure sufficient
for cooperative attorney) ; cf. In the Matter of Efros, 255 App. Div. 974, 8 N.Y.S.2d 83
(1938); Matter of Levy, 228 App. Div. 249, 239 N.Y. Supp. 377 (1930). Compare In the
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In view of the alternative means for securing the cooperation of witnesses
at a judicial inquiry, the necessity for resorting to a "duty of candor" is less
than manifest. Until this necessity is demonstrated more convincingly than it
was in Cohen, a lawyer's membership in the bar should not be withdrawn for
exercising the privilege against self-incrimination.
Matter of Landsman, 250 App. Div. 414, 294 N.Y. Supp. 180 (1937) ("resisted the
charges"-disbarred for solicitation), with In the Matter of Mendelsohn, 250 App. Div.
417, 294 N.Y. Supp. 193 (1937) ("frankly admitted" guilt-five year suspension for solici-
tation and bribery) (same day, same court).
